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propositionhood; is it a property, and if so, what property, and 
how does it differ from the possibility of something's being red? 
I wish Slote had developed this system of ideas more fully. It seems 
to me more interesting, and more promising, than the main project 
of the book. 
ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Deviant Logic. SUSAN HAACK. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974. xiv, 191 P. $11.95. 
The aim of Deviant Logic is to examine "the philosophical, rather 
than the purely formal, consequences of adoption of non-standard 
systems" of logic. The questions are whether we could be justified 
in accepting a system of logic that is unlike classical two-valued 
quantificational logic, and what gains or troubles this might in- 
volve. Haack approaches these questions directly, by giving some 
general ideas about the reasons there might be for changing one's 
logic, and then sharpening them in discussing a number of partic- 
ular cases. She argues that the possibility of a change of logic is 
provided only by suggestions of "deviant logics," in which some 
accepted principle is rejected, rather than "extended logics," in 
which the range of logic is extended to include new terms and 
principles. And then she argues that there are no convincing 
reasons why some occasion might not arise which makes us adopt 
a deviant logic. She argues that, whatever the difficulties and com- 
plications of a deviant logic, the relevant item for comparison is 
the difficulty and complication of a logic plus a total theory of the 
world, and it might, just might, turn out that some combination 
of deviant logic and theory of the world did its job more easily 
and simply than any more orthodox alternative. Still, there may 
not actually be any such cases, present or looming, and so she con- 
siders suggested changes of logic in connection with future contin- 
gents, intuitionism, vagueness, nondenoting singular terms, and 
quantum logic. In each of these cases she finds that the threat to 
classical logic is not very serious. Either the proposed logic is best 
interpreted as an extended rather than as a deviant logic, or the 
reasons for thinking that adopting it would help explain or unify 
our beliefs are unconvincing. 
The project needs doing, and Haack's approach is natural and 
promising. There is surely little point to nurturing logical systems 
This content downloaded from 142.103.160.110 on Wed, 16 Sep 2015 23:33:02 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BOOK REVIEWS 309 
without some idea of the employment they may find, and surely 
some general ideas about the ways in which different kinds of logic 
might be useful would be worth having. The trouble is, she doesn't 
give us any. Each of the later chapters has a conclusion telling why 
one particular kind of deviance does not pay, and the first three 
chapters give reasons for not ruling out deviance a priori; but there 
are no conclusions about the kinds of reasons that might prompt 
changes in logic, as opposed to changes in physics or meteorology, 
or about the likelihood that such changes will occur. 
Haack is caught between her doctrines and her intentions, I 
think. If the topic is change in logic, and changes in logic are 
justified by the nature of particular combinations of theory and 
logic, then we need to see the details of the theories that are to 
be wedded to the logics. Presumably the central cases are quantum 
mechanics and intuitionism; it is hard to see how to discuss them 
along these lines without a real visit to the Hilbert spaces and the 
free-choice sequences. But then the discussion will have to get 
turgid and technical, as Haack's wonderfully isn't, and conclusions 
of any generality are unlikely. Then what is the book for? 
In fact, Haack's method in much of the book seems at odds with 
her epistemology. She seems, for example, to be looking for simple 
arguments showing how to escape quantum-mechanical paradoxes 
by tinkering with logical laws. This would make more sense on a 
less holistic epistemology. It would also make sense if the aim were 
to look at the quantum-mechanical beliefs we already have, to see 
whether there is a deviant logic somehow implicit in them. Now, 
although this is not what Haack thinks she is doing, it would ex- 
plain parts of her discussion of future contingents, vagueness, and 
singular terms. For many of the authors she discusses in these chap- 
ters are arguing not that we could or should change our logic to 
deal with difficulties about these things, but rather that the logic 
embodied in the way we actually do now think about them is not 
built along classical lines. No change needed. 
But although adopting a new strange logic may be a very dif- 
ferent matter from discovering that one always had one, the process 
of intuitively conceiving how a law of classical logic might fail, of 
understanding the proposal, is rather the same in both cases. And 
Haack's choice of topics seems in this way very natural: one under- 
stands how it might be that electrons or numbers might disobey 
classical logic by thinking of them through analogies with future 
contingencies, vague predicates, or fictions. Then, whether or not 
one thinks that the logic of these is actually deviant, the fact that 
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there is a certain tension in our thought about them, tending 
toward deviance, gives one a way to understand deviance elsewhere. 
This needs to be understood better. Haack's arrangement of 
topics, and some of her arguments, are suggestive here, but no 
more than suggestive. What is it about these areas-the future, the 
abstract, the irreal, the vague-that creates the tension between 
them and classical logic? One common factor is the way in which 
semantical concepts are strained, and their presuppositions fail. 
In fiction we don't have truth, facts, and factuality, of any ordinary 
sort, and, if the logic of the future is deviant, then some things 
are going to be true that are not true now.' This does little more 
than restate the problem: of course truth cracks when logic bends. 
But it points the right way; in all these cases one can doubt that 
the objective relations that link words and facts exist. Thus the 
important thing about the future is that, whatever the details of 
the relations that constitute a sentence's truth, they are real phys- 
ical relations requiring real causal connections of some sort, and, 
if there are not enough causal relations among present facts, con- 
tinuing objects, laws of nature, and future facts, present words 
may not be related to future facts as they are to present facts. And 
if differences of scale present causal barriers as differences in time 
may, so that measurements of the states of quantum-mechanical 
systems determine the details of what they measure, then again 
words, in the larger world, may have trouble connecting with facts, 
in the quantum world.2 
One cannot take truth or logic to be unstructured, truth as a 
simple unanalyzed predicate or logic as something we unequiv- 
ocally "have," like a theory or a custom. The fact surely is that at 
any time we have theories of the world, from which we argue and 
reason in varying patterns, suppressing and uncovering premises 
according to whim and convenience, and in this complex of belief 
and practice logicians find logic, guided by generally observed 
patterns of argument and generally held conceptions of truth, ref- 
erence, and reality. Some changes in theory may require a rethink- 
1This provides a good example of the way in which the. intelligibility of 
deviance in one area helps one to understand the assertion of deviance in 
another: Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic, in "Semantical Analysis of 
Intuitionistic Logic I" in J. L. Crossley and Michael Dummett, eds. Formal 
Systems and Recursive Functions (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1964), in effect 
treats intuitionistic logic as a tense logic. 
2This account is roughly what you would get by reinterpreting Dummett's 
account in "Truth," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LIM (1958/9): 141- 
162, through the apparatus of Hartry Field's "Tarski's Theory of Truth," this 
JOURNAL, LXIX, 13 (July 13, 1972): 347-375. 
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ing of this process, because they undermine the semantical assump- 
tions that justified the imposition of a particular logic on the 
complexities of our arguings. Then, presumably, one understands 
the logic one finds in the new theory by comparing it with the 
logics one could have found in the old theories. 
ADAM MORTON 
Princeton University 
NOTES AND NEWS 
The Wittgenstein House in Vienna, in the third district of Landstrasse, 
was designed in i929 by Ludwig Wittgenstein for his sister, to whom it 
belonged after his death. In I974, it was a distinguished building in dis- 
repair and in danger of demolition. In I975 it was bought for $470,000 by 
the Embassy of Bulgaria, to house a new Bulgarian cultural institute. It 
has now been renovated (at a cost exceeding the purchase price) and 
is open to the public; it provides space for concerts, exhibitions, and 
meetings. 
The Institute of Society and the Life Sciences is sponsoring three work- 
shops during the summer of I977: A general Workshop on Medical Ethics 
and a Workshop on Death, Dying, and Public Policy will run concurrently 
at Sarah Lawrence College in Bronxville, N.Y., during the week of June 
i9-26; a Workshop on Ethical Theory in a Medical Context will be held 
at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California, during the period June 
26-July 2. Workshop fees are $225 plus additional room and board costs. 
For further information, write: Institute of Society,- Ethics and the Life 
Sciences, Box 65I, 360 Broadway, Hastings-on Hudson, New York I0706. 
NEXA, San Francisco State University's NEH-funded Science-Humanities 
project, is pleased to announce a symposium on Sociobiology: Implications 
for Human Studies, June I4/I5, I977. Panelists include: philosophers 
Marjorie Grene, David Hull, Jerome Schneewind, and John Searle; biolo- 
gists Donald Griffin, Garrett Hardin, and George Wald; psychologists 
Frank Beach and Karl Pribram; economist Kenneth Boulding; physicist 
and historian of science Gerald Holton; and anthropologist S. L. Wash- 
burn. The symposium will occur in conjunction with the 58th Annual 
Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(Pacific Division). For further information, write: Anita Silvers, Depart- 
ment of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, i6oo Holloway Ave- 
nue, San Francisco 94I32. 
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